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ABSTRACT
Security policy specification languages are a response to today’s complex and vulnerable software
climate. These languages allow an individual or organization to restrict and modify the behavior of
third-party applications such that they adhere to the rules specified in the policy. As software grows
in complexity, so do the security policies that govern them. Existing policy specification languages
have not adapted to the growing complexity of the software they govern and as a result do not
scale well, often resulting in code that is overly complex or unreadable. Writing small, isolated
policies as separate modules and combining them is known as policy composition, and is an area
in which existing policy specification languages have a number of drawbacks. Policy composition is
unpredictable and nonstandard with existing languages. PoCo is a new policy specification language
that uses signed regular expressions to return sets of allowed and denied actions as output from its
policies, allowing policies to be combined with standard set operations in an algebraic way. This
thesis covers my contribution to the PoCo project in creating a formal grammar for the language,
developing a static analysis tool for policy designers, and implementation of the first PoCo language
compiler and runtime for the Java platform.
iii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As computer software grows increasingly more complex, so do the security issues involving the
software. Security policy specification languages allow different organizations to define and enforce
rules relevant to their interests and often apply that to untrusted third-party software. These
languages give users the power to restrict, prevent, and modify actions they deem security relevant.
Software codebases tend to grow and change over time, which means that the policies that
monitor them must grow and adapt as well. Just as general-purpose programming languages have
evolved to deal with this growing complexity by offering a variety of methods and best practices to
modularize and organize code, so too must policy specification languages else they risk becoming
complex at best or unreadable at worst. Existing policy specification languages have a large problem
that is exacerbated by the ever-growing complexity of the software they monitor: they do not scale
well. Changing parts of existing policies may cause unintended changes elsewhere in the policy,
leading to a distortion of the policy designer’s original intention. As a result, the policy designer
must have a macro-level understanding of how all parts of a set of policies work together.
A modular policy specification language is not new (see [27, 5, 22]). Creating small, self-
contained, modular policies focused on a single concern and combining them to create a larger
security policy is known as policy composition. The goal is that each piece of a modular policy can
be modified and addressed in isolation within a larger, combined policy. While individual policies
might be easily-understood, the policy combination mechanisms provided by existing policy specifi-
cation languages are not easy to reason about or behave in unpredictable ways, sometimes requiring
the policy designer to understand and anticipate specific nuances of the language’s execution.
In some policy specification languages that are strictly limited to access control (i.e. simply
permitting or denying a action made by a monitored program), policy combination is more straight-
forward and even has the potential to be automated. More expressive policy specification languages
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that can enforce more than just the set of access control policies (e.g. these policies may modify
actions, promote unrelated actions, or a combination of the two) present a large problem for policy
composition.
My work builds on the PoCo policy specification language proposed by Daniel Lomsak [17].
PoCo is a general-purpose policy specification language with some unique qualities that make it
especially suited to tackling the policy composition issues described previously. Unlike other policy-
specification languages, PoCo makes use of regular expressions to express sets of actions during
the decision process. The key feature of PoCo that makes it unique among policy specification
languages is that policy composition obeys many algebraic properties. This allows the language to
be predictable and allows the language to be statically analyzed at compile time for a number of
code quality metrics.
The PoCo language uses regular expressions to represent abstract sets of actions. The language
is structured around sequences of input and output events, where each input is matched against a
regular expression and each output is a signed regular expression (SRE). A signed regular expression
is simply a regular expression prefixed with either a positive (+) or negative (-) sign to denote sets
of promoted (desired) or denied actions, respectively. Regular expressions are an expressive and
concise way to denote sets of actions. Because all PoCo policies return a single SRE for each
queried event, policy composition takes advantage of the regular expression’s algebraic properties.
For example, a policy may combine two SREs, either from subpolicies or different code paths
within the policy, to form a new SRE with set operators such as union, intersection, negation, and
disjunction.
At a high level, a PoCo policy will make one of three decisions for each queried event:
• Allow original event to proceed.
• Execute an alternative action if the queried event is an action, or return an alternative result
if the queried event is a result.
• Deny queried event and halt execution.
Conceptually, the root policy is the first policy queried with a security-relevant event. This
policy receives the ouput of all subpolicies and determines what result to return to the PoCo
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runtime. In PoCo, the graph of policies is directed and acyclic (DAG). The root policy has no
incoming edges and the leaves are the policies with no outgoing edges. When a security-relevant
event occurs, all policies in the DAG are queried by the PoCo runtime, starting with the leaves.
Each policy’s output is retained during the query such that each policy is queried once and only
once regardless of how many parent policies use its output.
The central thesis presented here is that an implementation of an expressive, general-purpose
policy specification language that uses regular expressions as a means for conveying decisions is
possible on the Java platform. This thesis describes my work on the PoCo project including
formalization of the language and creating a working implementation of a compiler and runtime to
prove the concepts of PoCo are viable. My contributions to the PoCo project are as follows:
1. Formalization of PoCo syntax and creation of a grammar for parser generation.
2. Creation of a static analysis policy “Scanner Tool” to analyze the number of method calls in
a monitored program that will be intercepted by a PoCo policy.
3. Creation of the PoCo runtime and compiler implementation alongside research partners Yan
Albright, Danielle Fergusson, and Donald Ray.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes existing policy speci-
fication languages and their limitations. Chapter 3 describes the PoCo language and its syntax in
detail. Chapter 4 covers the creation of the PoCo language parser and lexer grammar. Chapter 5
details the creation of the PoCo Scanner Tool, a static-analysis tool for exploring how many meth-
ods in the monitored program a policy interacts with. Chapter 6 details the implementation of the
PoCo compiler. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this paper with some observations on the project,
and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Policy-specification languages are an active area of research, with many different approaches
to solving the same problem of having a policy-specification language that is expressive, well-
defined, and scalable. Much of the existing work involves creating algebras for access control
policy composition ([8, 7, 21, 9]). Access control (i.e. denying or allowing an action) is the most
basic functionality a policy-specification language can expose and is universally supported by the
discussed languages, and by PoCo. Further still are efforts to introduce temporal aspects or state
to the policy model ([6, 20, 25]).
This section primarily focuses on existing policy-specification languages. The strengths and
weaknesses of each language are presented, along with their implementation details. The other
category of related work are the tools used to implement the PoCo language described later in
the paper. There are a number of common yet difficult tasks in language compilation that are
automated by these tools so that focus can shift to implementing the unique features of the language.
2.1 XACML
Extensible Access Control Markup Language, commonly known as XACML, is an open standard
for an XML-based access control language. As it is widely used in industry, it serves as a benchmark
for newer policy-specification languages [3]. XACML policies are written in XML and can be
combined using a small number of built-in policy combinators. Policies written in XACML can
specify an arbitrary number of conditions that must be satisfied to grant an access request. A
mechanism called an obligation is provided, allowing a policy to suggest arbitrary actions be taken
in the event that its decision is followed. The standard itself does not provide a formal semantics
for the language [19], creating several ambiguities regarding the execution of XACML policies (e.g.
a policy’s obligations may or may not be executed depending on decisions further up the policy
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tree) [22]. The standard also fails to provide any means of writing custom policy combinators in the
XACML language itself. Instead, these custom combinators must be implemented in the software
that interprets and enforces a XACML policy and is therefore written in whatever programming
language was used to implement the interpreter.
The XACML standard has three key weaknesses that limit its expressiveness. First, XACML
is only capable of specifying access control in practice. A policy limited to just access control only
has the power to permit or deny an action. Other usage scenarios such as prompting the user for
feedback before making a decision or modifying the return values of the requested action are all
beyond the scope of simple access control policies. While the standard does provide support for
suggesting actions be taken via the obligation mechanism, the execution of these obligations cannot
be guaranteed [22]. The obligation mechanism in XACML is typically ignored in most attempts
to analyze or extend the language [4, 16, 9] as obligations are treated as an implementation detail
at the point of enforcement rather than a core part of the specification. Alqatawna et al. [2]
propose a generalized obligation combination framework, although it is unable to address the core
inadequacies of XACML’s obligations such as the inability to query policies on an obligation’s
results or consider obligations during policy execution [19]. As there is no sanctioned language in
the XACML specification for writing a policy’s obligations, the authors of [2] recommend that more
robust support for obligations be added to the specification itself.
The second weakness is that XACML is a stateless architecture [3]. Any scenario where a
policy would need to reference past events would therefore be impossible. Maintaining state is a
key feature for a policy-specification language else the set of enforceable policies is greatly reduced
[12]. The set of enforceable policies for XACML is therefore a proper subset of PoCo’s. Simple
scenarios would be impossible such as limiting access to a file after some number of read operations,
or preventing writes to a file if another has been read.
Finally, XACML only provides eight built-in combinators but is lacking standard algebraic
combinators such as conjunction and disjunction. Some of the provided combinators, such as first-
applicable, lack algebraic properties. For example, the first-applicable combinator’s result depends
on the order in which it queries its subpolicies [22]. Having a limited set of built-in combinators is
further compounded by the lack of any formal language for policy designers to specify their own
[16]. Some other common combinators that cannot be created with XACML are consensus and
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majority. Combination of obligations in XACML similarly lacks algebraic properties. Obligations
are only promoted from those policies that came to the same decision as the root-level policy [22].
Policies will therefore not be able to know when or if their obligations are executed. Similarly,
there is no guarantee that the obligations will be executed in a certain order. For a policy designer,
algebraic properties for policy combination simplify policy development because the execution of
their policy is predictable even when combined with other policies.
2.2 AspectJ
AspectJ is an extension to the Java programming language that adds support for aspect-oriented
programming (AOP). AOP allows a developer to create encapsulations of state and behavior that
exist outside the traditional class hierarchy of a program but instead crosscut the hierarchy in some
way. For example, an aspect might log to a file whenever ports are opened at any time during the
execution of a program. Aspects are the basic functional unit of an aspect-oriented program. The
two essential parts of an aspect are pointcuts and advice. Advice are simply method declarations
defined against one or more pointcuts. Pointcuts define where a piece of advice will execute (e.g.
when a certain method is called). One common use of pointcuts is to match a specified method call
[27]. A pointcut is a powerful tool because it allows for wildcard matching of method signatures
(e.g. “int *(..)” matches any method that returns an integer value). In AspectJ, one pointcut has
the potential to match many different method signatures.
AspectJ’s ability to monitor method calls within a program lends itself to security-policy spec-
ification. Another policy-specification language discussed later, LoPSiL [11], utilizes AspectJ in its
implementation. One drawback to using AspectJ solely as a policy-specification language is that
AspectJ is a general purpose programming language. As a superset of the Java language’s syntax,
AspectJ does not enforce any particular structure or organization for policies beyond the fundamen-
tal aspect, advice, and pointcut patterns. [27]. It is therefore up to the policy designer to enforce
a design methodology that will ensure policies are still able to be reasoned about as they grow
in complexity. This makes AspectJ more suitable as an intermediate layer; a policy-specification
language can compile down to AspectJ, allowing a programmer to code in an environment tailored
to runtime security policy design.
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Although AspectJ is not a policy-specification language, it is used for this purpose. As men-
tioned above, the drawback of the language is that is provides no framework or structure for policy
composition. Assume that we wish to combine two premade aspects, each representing a self-
contained security policy. If both aspects operate on a shared set of pointcuts, both aspects will
execute sequentially in arbitrary order. This is called aspect interference [26]. There is not a lot
a policy designer can do to combat aspect interference other than specify priority to enforce an
ordering of execution for the aspects. A proposed extension to the AspectJ language would make
aspects more intelligent about these conflicts and give them the ability to modify their behavior
when interference occurs [26], while the authors of [14] created a static-analysis algorithm to detect
conflicts when multiple aspects operate on a pointcut.
The process of instrumenting a program with AspectJ is called weaving. There are two basic
ways in which AspectJ constructs can be weaved into an existing program:
1. At compile time. If the source of the programs you wish to instrument are available to you,
you can compile the AspectJ code alongside it and the outputted bytecode will have the
appropriate AspectJ hooks weaved into it. Security policies would be of limited use if we
were required to obtain the source code to all programs we wished to monitor. Commercial
software or software of unknown origin require another weaving method [27].
2. Bytecode (or binary) weaving. Compiled Java programs come as class files (e.g. those in a
JAR file) containing Java bytecode. An aspect can be weaved into this bytecode. Typically
this can be done prior to running the program on the JVM using tools provided with the
AspectJ installation. The bytecode weaving can also be performed at run-time using custom
Java class loaders. Either way, the end result is the same: a compiled program without its
source code available will be instrumented with the provided aspect [27].
2.3 Polymer
Polymer is a policy-specification language that both addresses the limited functionality and
ambiguous obligation propagation of XACML while maintaining a programming methodology de-
signed for security policies, unlike AspectJ. Sharing much of the same syntax as Java, Polymer
allows for arbitrary logic to be inserted into policies, providing a greater level of flexibility than in
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XACML. A policy in Polymer returns one of six suggestions for any queried action. The suggestions
are named as such because a policy has no guarantee that its suggestion will be followed at the root
policy. Of particular interest are the insert and replace suggestions. These allow a policy to suggest
performing an arbitrary action prior to making a decision (e.g. prompt the user for permission)
or replace the return value of an action. Polymer is therefore capable of specifying more than just
strict access control policies [5].
The basic unit of Polymer is the policy, which contains a query method, accept method, and
a result method. The query method is how the Polymer runtime obtains a policy’s response to
an action. This query method must not alter a policy’s state because there is no guarantee that
whatever response a policy provides will be followed. For this reason, a policy has a separate
accept method that is called when the runtime is taking the action suggested by a policy. The final
method, result, is called after an insert or replacement suggestion is followed and alerts the policy
of the return value of that action [5].
Polymer is implemented as a bytecode rewriter that inserts execution hooks around security-
relevant methods in compiled programs and libraries, which are then used by the Java virtual
machine. In addition to providing the compiler Polymer policy files, the policy designer must
enumerate all security-relevant methods in another file. The compiler uses this list of security-
relevant methods to know where to weave its functionality in the monitored application. The team
also created a class loader that rewrites bytecode as classes are loaded, but not all libraries can
be rewritten this way. System libraries, for example, have to be ready upon loading the virtual
machine. Polymer’s implementation uses methods similar to those used by AspectJ, in which it
compiles and weaves code. The Polymer team was aware of this similarity but decided to roll their
own implementation for the finer level of control it would grant them [5].
Polymer’s structure still relies on the policy designer to adhere to its design patterns for it to
be effective. For example, nothing other than convention prevents a policy’s query method from
altering state, although it must not for correct behavior. While there are benefits to having a syntax
based on a general-purpose language like Java, it also means that convention must be followed for
the language to behave as advertised, instead of the language itself enforcing that structure [5].
Policy composition in Polymer is flexible, allowing the policy designer to create their own policy
combinators if they wish. Polymer’s combinators can be powerful but also suffer from the same lack
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of structural enforcement as mentioned earlier. The built-in conjunction combinator lacks algebraic
properties, for example. The high level goal of the conjunction combinator is to take the most
restrictive decision from the subpolicies. In Polymer, the conjunction operator lacks associative and
commutative properties because of its handling of “insert” suggestions. These insertion suggestions
will be executed in the order that the sub policies were specified. The language’s adherence to
complete mediation means that each policy is also queried on each insertion suggestion, which
means that it is possible a policy’s decision could change as sibling policies execute their insertions
[5].
2.4 LoPSiL
LoPSiL is a location-based policy-specification language. As a result of its limited scope com-
pared to the more general Polymer language, LoPSiL’s syntax and structure are tailored to policies
relating to the location of the user. Policies in LoPSiL have the ability to react to varying geolo-
cation accuracies and polling frequencies as well as standard location coordinates. The language
is of particular use in the mobile computing space, where location services are nearly ubiquitous.
Using LoPSiL, a policy designer may restrict an application from acquiring location information
when the device is in a certain region (e.g., near the user’s home) or during certain timeframes
(e.g., prevent company-mandated applications from tracking the user during non-work hours) [11].
Despite LoPSiL’s novelty, it lacks any sort of support or framework for composing policies. This
is in part a side effect of the language design, where a policy specifies parameters (e.g. location
granularity assumptions and update frequency assumptions) that are managed by the LoPSiL
runtime environment. LoPSiL policies are as a result limited in scope as there is no provided
method for handling the complexity involved with combining separate policies [11].
AspectJ is utilized extensively in LoPSiL’s implementation, and the practices used by its creators
inspire the work described later in this paper. LoPSiL’s syntax is based off of Java’s so that the
process of integrating a LoPSiL policy into AspectJ code is straightforward and allows the LoPSiL
implementation to avoid many of the low-level details that would be required when creating a
custom bytecode rewriter. Similar to Polymer, the LoPSiL policy designer must supply, in addition
to their policy, a text file listing all security-relevant method calls their policy should be aware
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of. The method calls specified in the aforementioned text file are written in AspectJ pointcut
syntax. The compiler will use the method list to generate AspectJ code that forwards method
call information to the LoPSiL policies during runtime. The LoPSiL policy (which is already Java
syntax) is converted to Java code by simply importing the precompiled LoPSiL runtime classes. The
final stage of compilation involves weaving the AspectJ files with the Java programs and libraries
to be monitored, which is accomplished using AspectJ’s weaving tools [11].
2.5 ANTLR
The projects discussed later in this paper utilize the ANTLR parser generator to create the code
required to lex and parse a policy-specification language. ANTLR is an open-source lexer and parser
generator written in Java [23]. A lexer converts a stream of characters (typically source code) into
a series of tokens, which are the smallest logical groupings for the characters. Given the stream of
tokens generated by the lexer, a parser will obtain the structure of the document according to some
reference grammar. Parsing and lexing are typically the initial steps when compiling a program.
Another common parser generator is Bison, which is itself based on an even older generator
known as YACC [13]. Both ANTLR and Bison require a context free grammar in Backus-Naur
form (BNF) [23, 13]. A context free grammar specifies parser rules in a recursive way with each
rule defined by the tokens and other parser rules it expands to [18].
ANTLR and Bison attack the same problem in different ways. Whereas Bison generates an
LALR parser, ANTLR generates LL(*) parsers. LR parsing, used in Bison, is also known as
bottom-up parsing. This form of parsing is able to recognize more languages than an LL parser
with the same number of lookahead characters [18]. LL(k) parsing is known as top-down parsing.
In this scheme, the parser must figure out what nonterminal it is looking at with only k lookahead
characters before it begins parsing that nonterminal. An LL(*) parser is not limited to a fixed
number of lookahead characters, having instead the ability to match based on regular expressions.
Therefore, a LL(*) parser should be able to match any nonterminal that can be matched with a
regular expression [18]. One significant drawback of LL parsers is that they are unable to parse
grammar rules that have left-recursion, while LR parsers are able to parse both left and right
recursion. ANTLR rewrites left-recursive grammars behind the scenes, allowing the grammar to
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maintain the clarity that left-recursion provides (e.g. expr : expr + expr). ANTLR’s parsing
engine is actually an extension to LL(*) parsing called ALL(*) or adaptive-LL parsing. ALL(*)
parsing allows the parser engine to examine the input stream of characters during runtime, which
allows the parser to adapt without the need to statically predict all possible parsing outcomes. This
means that writing a grammar for both Bison and ANTLR is similar, with ANTLR making sure
to correct for any issues specific to LL parsing (e.g. left recursion) behind-the-scenes [23].
ANTLR automatically creates a parse tree from a provided grammar. A very common task in
compiler design is to traverse a parse tree, performing specific actions at each node. ANTLR frees
the compiler designer from creating a parse tree traversal method by creating a visitor class. The
visitor class is a parse tree walker that automatically visits each node in the tree. By subclassing
the generated visitor class, a programmer can override this default behavior in an ad-hoc manner,
customizing the parse tree traversal only where required (e.g. to parse two tokens of an expression
in a specific order) [23]. This is a convenience not found in the Bison tool.
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CHAPTER 3
POCO SYNTAX OVERVIEW
PoCo’s parser and lexer are made to function correctly despite the language’s peculiarities.
Before we can discuss how we managed to create a parser for PoCo, we need to explain how
the language works in detail. In this chapter I will go over the PoCo syntax via examples to
illustrate how the various pieces of a policy fit together. In doing so, the reader will have a
better understanding of how PoCo’s seemingly simple syntax creates a number of problems when
implementing the parser because of its use of regular expressions.
3.1 Policy Structure
This section will provide a brief and high-level overview of key portions of PoCo’s syntax and
structure to aid discussion of the language’s implementation details. A PoCo policy at its most
basic consists of a single sequence of events, called an execution. An execution can contain other
executions (grouped in parentheses) or an exchange. Exchanges are the basic building blocks of a
PoCo policy. Each exchange is a self contained action/reaction pair for a set of events. An exchange
is composed of two parts: a matching regular expression and a resulting SRE response. When a
policy is queried with an action at runtime, that action is matched against the regular expression in
the exchange. If the match is successful, the SRE of that exchange is propagated upwards through
the PoCo policy [17].
As stated in Chapter 1, much of PoCo’s functionality and logic relies on and interacts with signed
regular expressions or SREs. A SRE is simply a regular expression with either a positive or negative
sign in front of it (e.g. +`(Open|Close)'). Positive SREs denote sets of permitted or promoted
actions while negative SREs denote sets of denied actions. PoCo’s power and expressiveness is
derived in large part from the usage of SREs as policy outputs. Since SREs represent sets of
actions, SREs can be manipulated and combined in predictable, algebraic ways [17]. PoCo’s syntax
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uses two symbols to indicate the beginning (backtick - `) and end (apostrophe - ') of a regular
expression string. PoCo SREs also use the % character as a wildcard. It is similar to the regular
expression .* that matches any sequence of characters, and is used instead of the period character
so that writing function call match strings is more straightforward (i.e. the policy designer may
write `File.open' instead of `File\.open').
A PoCo policy has five parts, three of which are optional. The elements of a PoCo policy are
listed below:
1. Policy name
2. Variable declarations (optional)
3. Function declarations (optional)
4. Primary execution
5. Transactions (optional)
The primary execution contains the body of the policy. All of a policy’s logic is defined within
its primary execution. The examples that follow in this section will further elaborate on the primary
execution’s syntax and structure.
One of the optional components, transactions, are pieces of arbitrary code written in the target
language (in the case of our implementation of PoCo, the target language is Java). Transactions
can be used as promoted actions from within a PoCo policy, allowing for complex operations to be
carried out in the native language of the monitored program.
The rest of this chapter will be composed of a series of three example PoCo policies to illustrate
the language’s syntax and semantics.
3.2 Example Policy - Attachments
Figure 3.1 shows a PoCo policy that is intended to monitor the types of files (attachments)
downloaded by an email client and warn the user when the attachment is potentially dangerous
(e.g. it is an executable or script). The high-level behavior of the policy is as follows:
1. If a file write operation is initiated and the extension matches one of the values in the provided
“dangerous” extensions, open a dialog box asking the user to permit the action.
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Attachments():
var call: RE
@message(call) [`The target is creating a file via\: $call . This is a dangerous
file type. Do you want to create this file\?'] :RE
@ext() [`.(exe|vbs|hta|mdb|bad)'] :RE
map (Union, -`$FileWrite($ext())',
< !Action(`$FileWrite($ext())') => Neutral >*
< Action(`@call[$FileWrite($ext())]') => +`$Confirm($message($call))' >
< !Result(`$Confirm($message($call))', `%') => +`$Confirm($message($call))' >*
(
<Result(`$Confirm($message($call))', `#Integer{OK_OPTION}') => +`$call' >
| <_ => Neutral >
)
)*
ExchangePrimary execution Inner execution
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Figure 3.1. Example PoCo policy for monitoring email attachments. The primary execution is
highlighted in the lightest gray while the inner execution is highlighted in a darker shade of gray.
Each individual exchange is shaded with the darkest shade of gray.
2. Wait for the user to select an action in the dialog box.
3. If the user elects to proceed, continue with the attempted file write action, otherwise deny
the action.
4. Repeat from Step 1.
Line 1 contains the policy name, Attachments. Note that policies can be parameterized with other
policies. This allows policies to use the results of other policies as part of their decision-making
process. An example of such a use would be a policy parameterized on two subpolicies P1 and P2,
where P2 is a more restrictive version of P1. The policy may decide to promote P1’s permissive
output only when a program has a valid signature, otherwise P2’s output is promoted.
Line 2 contains a variable declaration. In PoCo, all variables used in a policy must be declared
after the policy name. The format is var ID: TYPE where ID is the variable name and TYPE
indicates whether the variable is a regular expression (RE) or SRE. A variable’s value is bound at
runtime during a policy’s execution.
Lines 3-5 contain two function definitions. Like variables, functions can be declared as either
an RE or SRE type. Functions can also be parameterized. The syntax for a function definition is
@ID(PARAMS)[RE or SRE] : TYPE where ID is the function name, PARAMS is a (possibly empty)
comma-separated list of parameter names, and TYPE is either RE or SRE and matches the value
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inside the square brackets. Line 3 also contains the first example of a variable usage within a
regular expression using the dollar sign syntax ($call). Any time a dollar sign symbol appears in
an RE or SRE, PoCo will expand the value of the function or variable into the string at runtime.
For variables, the dollar sign simply prefixes the variable name. For functions, the parameters must
also be supplied (an example of that can first be seen on Line 7).
Also note that this policy makes use of globally defined functions Confirm and FileWrite.
Confirm is defined as a function call to open a dialogue box with a supplied message (e.g.
JOptionPane.showMessageDialog() in Java). FileWrite is defined similarly to the example be-
low:
@FileWrite(ext) [`File.open($ext)'] : RE
The FileWrite function takes one argument to specify a filename extension of a file opened by the
File.open() method.
Line 6 marks the start of the policy’s primary execution (shaded in the lightest gray), which
continues until Line 14. All executions are denoted with opening and closing parentheses; however
these parentheses can be omitted for single-element executions (i.e., executions containing a single
exchange). The execution on Line 6 is a specialized form of a PoCo execution called a map, which
is similar to the map functionality in many functional languages. The map function takes three
arguments: a set operation function (e.g. union, disjunction), an SRE, and an execution. The
third argument, a child execution, is wrapped such that the SRE returned by the map is a product
of applying the set operator (argument 1) to the SRE (argument 2) and the value returned by the
child execution (argument 3).
Executions are by default evaluated sequentially such that each time the policy is queried, the
next item in the policy’s primary execution is queried. An execution can be made alternating such
that all elements of an execution are queried at the same time by placing a bar symbol | between
items. Similarly, an execution can be postfixed with two operators that modify the sequential
execution. The first operator, *, means that an execution can be queried zero or more times. The
second operator, +, means that an execution can be queried one or more times. These operators
are intended to emulate the behavior of the same operators in regular expressions.
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Line 7 begins the first exchange within the primary execution. The exchanges, shaded in the
darkest gray, begin with a < symbol and end with a > symbol. The first part of the exchange after
< is the match portion. The match is typically a regular expression but can also be a built-in PoCo
operator that returns an RE. The arrow symbol ( => ) is not only the syntactical divider between
the match and the response portions of an exchange but a visual cue that a match on the left will
promote the response on the right. The response section of an exchange on the right side of the
arrow symbol is always an SRE.
A PoCo policy executes by iterating over its primary execution. Imagine a hidden index variable
is managed by the policy which identifies the current element in the execution. When an exchange
is queried, it will return its SRE only if there is a match. It is therefore important for policy
designers to make sure a policy will be able to act on the set of all possible events at each step in
its execution.
The exchange on Line 7 uses a specialized match function Action, which will only match on
action attempts. The opposite of Action is the Result function, which will match only on a
completed action. Line 7 is also an implicit single-element execution with a * operator, which
means that this exchange can execute an unlimited number of times, or not at all. If the action is
not a file write operation, this policy does not consider it relevant and will return a neutral SRE.
Line 8 matches any call to write a dangerous filetype. There is a new syntax used here to bind
the value of the captured event to the previously-declared call. The syntax for variable binding
is @ID[RE] where ID is the variable name and RE is the regular expression to match to an event.
Note that the combination of Line 7 and 8 ensures that that the policy can respond to the set of
all possible operations at this stage in the policy’s execution. This exchange will promote via a
positive SRE a dialog box asking the user to proceed. If the action is a file write operation, present
a dialog box alerting the user to the action.
Line 9 is another exchange with a * modifier. The purpose of this call is to make sure that
the dialog box is actually presented. A PoCo policy has no guarantee that a promoted action
will actually be acted upon when composed with other policies, so this exchange will repeatedly
promote the dialogue box action until it sees a result. If not the result of the dialog box, promote
the dialog box again.
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Line 10 begins an inner execution that alternates between the exchanges on Lines 11 and 12.
The exchange on Line 11 checks if the return value of the dialog is in the affirmative and promotes
the file write action. Line 12 is a catch-all exchange using the wildcard match _ that promotes
neutral for all other possible events. PoCo’s object syntax appears in the SRE of Line 11. The
object syntax lets the PoCo runtime match specific values. The syntax is #ID{VALUE} where ID is
a name of a class in the source language (e.g. the Integer Java class) and VALUE is the value
to assign the instance of that object. If the user wishes to proceed, allow the file write. Otherwise
deny.
In this example it is important to note that the map operator will make all Neutral values deny
the file write action. Also, one might wonder why a union of a permit and deny action (i.e. the map
will union a deny SRE with the permit SRE from Line 11) is possible. As explained in chapter 1,
the union operator in PoCo is by default an optimistic union meaning positive values are favored
over identical negative values.
Finally, the primary execution ends on Line 14. The primary execution has a * modifier, so it
will repeat itself as many times as necessary.
3.3 Example Policy - Audit
Listing 3.1 contains the code for the Audit policy. The Audit policy wraps another PoCo policy
and logs the decisions made by that policy to a file while at the same time propagating those
decisions upward.
Line 1 contains the policy name and its parameters, a child Policy p, and a filename of the
log file String f. A child policy can be used just like any other variable within a PoCo policy.
Lines 2-3 contain variable definitions. Variable act will be used to store the attempted action,
out will store the child policy’s output on the queried action, and ps will store a reference to the
output file.
The Audit policy is designed to run in a loop, endlessly logging to a file once started. The
exchanges on Lines 5-8 however run only once during the lifetime of the Audit policy and are used
for one-time setup tasks. Line 5 binds any action query to the act variable and simultaneously
stores the child policy’s output in the out variable. Note the use of the binary operator && in the
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match sequence of this exchange. Variable binding always returns a true value so the && operator is
a shortcut to performing multiple bindings in a single match. This exchange promotes a transaction,
fopen, to open the file f. On any action, query the subpolicy while promoting the file open action
for the log file.
1 Audit(Policy p, String f):
2 var act : RE
3 var out : RE
4 var ps : RE
5 <Action(`@act[%]') && @out[`$p'] => +`fopen($f)'>
6 <!Result(`fopen($f)', `%') => +`fopen($f)'>*
7 <Result(`fopen($f)', `@ps[%]') => +`log($ps, $out, $act)'>
8 <!Result(`log($ps, $out, $act)', `%') => +`log($ps, $out, $act)'>*
9 (
10 <!Infinite(Conjunction(Positive($out), Complement(+`$act'))) => $out>
11 |<Subset($out, +`$act') => +`$act'>
12 |<!Infinite(Positive(Results($out))) => $out>
13 |<!Subset($out, -`$act') && !Subset($out, +`$act') => +`$act'>
14 |<_ => $out>
15 <Result(`%', `%') => $p>*
16 <Action(`@act[%]')&&@out[`$p'] => +`log($ps, $out, $act)'>
17 <!Result(`log($ps, $out, $act)', `%') => +`log($ps, $out, $act)'>*
18 )*
19
20 transaction private static PrintStream fopen(String fn) {
21 return new PrintStream(
22 new BufferedOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(fn)),
23 true
24 );
25 }
26
27 transaction private static void log(PrintStream ps, SRE s, Action a) {
28 ps.println("On trigger action " + a.toString());
29 ps.println("Subpolicy output: " + s.toString());
30 }
Listing 3.1. Audit Policy
Line 6 is another example of an exchange that runs indefinitely to ensure the action promoted
in Line 5 is actually executed. Until the log file is opened, promote the file open action for the log
file.
Line 7 binds the result of the file open action to the ps variable and promotes another transac-
tion, log, to write the queried action and subpolicy’s output to a file. When the log file is opened,
write the action and subpolicy’s output to the log file.
Similar to Line 6, Line 8 ensures the logging action from Line 7 is executed.
On Lines 9-18 is a child execution that executes indefinitely. Lines 10-14 alternate between five
different exchanges. These exchanges represent the following five possibilities of subpolicy output:
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1. Subpolicy has permited/promoted a finite set of actions where the queried action act may or
may not be a proper subset.
2. Subpolicy has permitted actions that include the queried action act.
3. The subpolicy has permitted a finite number of results.
4. The queried action act is neither permitted nor denied by the subpolicy.
5. All other scenarios.
The exchange on Line 10 represents the first scenario. A number of new boolean match operators
are introduced here. First, we use the unary Complement operator to get the set of all possible
actions excluding +`$act'. The unary Positive operator returns only the set of positive values
from the subpolicy’s output. These two values are provided to the binary Conjunction operator
which returns the set of intersecting actions from two sets. Finally, the unary Infinite operator
returns true if a set covers an infinite number of actions. Since we’re negating the result of Infinite,
we want to know if the policy has promoted an action outside of the queried action. The net result:
if the subpolicy’s output contains a finite set of actions excluding the queried action, promote the
subpolicy’s output.
Line 11 represents the second scenario. Here, we use the binary Subset operator to check if
the queried action is part of the actions permitted by the subpolicy. If the subpolicy permits the
queried action, permit the action.
Line 12 represents the third scenario. Here we check that the results permitted by the subpolicy
is a finite set (i.e. the subpolicy has done more than return a wildcard). If the subpolicy has a
finite set of permitted actions, promote the subpolicy’s output.
Line 13 represents the fourth scenario. Here, we check to see that the queried action is neither
permitted nor denied by the subpolicy. We interpret this as the subpolicy not considering the
action relevant and will therefore permit the action. If the subpolicy does not care about the queried
action, permit it.
Line 14 represents the final scenario and defaults to promoting the subpolicy’s output if none
of the other scenarios are true. Line 15 is also a catch-all that simply defers any result events to
the subpolicy.
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Line 16 will capture the next queried action event and output it to the log file similar to Lines
5 and 7. Line 17 is identical to Line 8.
Lines 20-30 contain transaction methods written in native Java code. These methods are
attached to the generated PoCo policy object and can be called from within the policy. As the
name implies, transactions are treated as atomic actions in PoCo.
3.4 Example Policy - Root
The PoCo language also supports a slightly different and more restricted syntax for declaring
a root policy. PoCo policies are intended to be self-contained and modular. To combine various
policies together, a root policy can define a policy tree describing how each policy is queried from
the root.
1 import DenyEmails
2 import NoOpenPorts
3
4 Main():
5 tree rootNode = Union(DenyEmails(), NoOpenPorts())
Listing 3.2. PoCo Root Policy
Listing 3.2 is an example of a small root policy that combines the results of two policies:
DenyEmails and NoOpenPorts. A root policy is structured similarly to a normal PoCo policy, but
the policy’s body may only contain tree definitions. Each tree may be defined in terms of an SRE
operator (e.g. Union or Conjunction), another PoCo policy, or another tree. The first tree in the
root policy becomes the root node of the entire policy tree.
The syntax for a tree definition is as follows:
tree NAME = ID ( PARAMS )
where NAME is the name of the tree while ID can either be a policy name, name of another tree, or
an SRE operator. PARAMS is a comma-separated list of parameters to the tree node.
The PoCo policy examples presented in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 have demonstrated the PoCo
syntax and structure in enough detail for our discussion of the parser implementation to proceed.
While the syntax of PoCo is limited to more general-purpose programming languages, its expres-
siveness and power are derived from the regular-expression syntax of its SREs.
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CHAPTER 4
PARSER IMPLEMENTATION
The first step in implementing a complete PoCo compiler is to implement the parser. The
parsing stage of compilation processes the input source file not at a character by character level,
but as a series of predefined language-specific tokens. This series of tokens is obtained by running
the source program through a separate program called a lexer. At this level, only basic errors
will be caught such as invalid characters in variable names. Once the lexer has output a stream
of tokens, the parser groups the tokens into semantic units according to the rules specified in a
provided grammar file. Parsing will catch even more errors in the source program because the
grouping of tokens must now have meaning (e.g. new new would trigger a parser error in Java). As
stated in Chapter 2, the PoCo parser and lexer implementation uses the ANTLR generator [23].
This chapter will go over the process of implementing the PoCo parser. First, a number of the
difficulties associated with parsing PoCo will be discussed. Then, a discussion of the lexer rules
and parser grammar will follow.
4.1 Parser Implementation Issues
There are a few unique challenges related to parsing a language such as PoCo. Languages such
as C or Java have string literals (usually a sequence of characters between a set of quotes), but they
don’t have to parse what’s inside of the strings. PoCo’s regular expressions are similar to string
literals in the way they are used as data in the policy evaluation process, but they can also have
structures within that are semantically relevant to compilation.
During compilation of a PoCo policy, the PoCo-specific structures within the regular expressions
must be parsed and translated while at the same time leaving the raw regular expression intact to
be used for matching at runtime. Typically, when parsing a string literal in another language, the
lexer would treat all characters between the start and end symbols (typically quotes) as part of the
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literal and output a single token. For PoCo we do not have the luxury of treating all characters
between the opening and closing symbols of a regular expression (` and ') as part of a regular
expression literal — we need to know the details of what happens inside the regular expression
while treating the bulk of it as a string literal. This required the use of ANTLR’s lexer modes.
Lexing modes allow us to switch the lexer to a new scope when a certain token is reached, where
each mode has completely separate and distinct set of token definitions. These modes can be
popped and pushed off a stack so that we can switch between modes at any time during the lexing
process. This gives us the power to use a completely different set of tokens while inside certain
PoCo language constructs than the ones used while outside.
For PoCo, we triggered a lexing mode shift whenever the opening character of a regular ex-
pression (`) was encountered, and popped the mode off of the stack when unescaped end character
(') was encountered. A regular expression is a specialized string and can contain an arbitrary
sequence of characters whereas the PoCo code outside of a regular expression has a very limited
set of acceptable tokens. Within the regular expression we also check for PoCo-specific syntax (e.g.
variable binding `@call[%]') which can also trigger additional lexing modes. The power of lexing
modes does come at a cost, however, as distinct entry and exit tokens are needed to trigger the
switching of the various lexing modes. This led to some last-minute PoCo syntax tweaks (e.g. the
backtick character used to begin regular expressions). The flexibility and power afforded by lexing
modes also lends itself to a more complicated grammar. Similarly, since each mode is completely
separate, any overlap in token scope requires the tokens be declared in each mode. This creates
complexity and makes the grammar more prone to errors.
Some of the PoCo-specific structures encountered within the regular expressions cannot be
statically resolved. For example, a matching regular expression might be written as `$call',
which means that the variable call should be inserted into this string. If call is assigned during
runtime, then the value of this regular expression cannot be determined at compile time. Similarly,
there exist PoCo statements such as variable binding and SRE operators that change the value of a
string at runtime. To address this issue, the PoCo parser “slices” up regular expression literals into
a series of string literals and PoCo syntax. This way, the parser can generate code to reassemble
the string at runtime while integrating the PoCo-specific functionality into the string.
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17 TRANS: 'transaction' -> pushMode(TRANSACTIONS) ;
18 NEUTRAL: 'Neutral' ;
19 MAIN: 'Main' ;
20 VAR: 'var' ;
21 IMPORT: 'import';
22 TREE: 'tree';
23 DOT: '.' ;
24 LPAREN: '(' ;
25 RPAREN: ')' ;
26 LBRACE: '{' ;
27 RBRACE: '}' ;
28 MAP: 'map' ;
29 COMMA: ',' ;
30 AT: '@' ;
31 RBRACKET: ']' ;
32 LBRACKET: '[' ;
33 DOLLAR: '$' ;
34 LTICK: '`' -> pushMode(INSIDERE) ;
Listing 4.1. PoCo Lexer Modes Lines 17-34
4.2 Lexing Rules
The PoCo syntax has been discussed in detail via the examples presented earlier in this chapter.
Similarly, the reasoning behind some of the design decisions for our parser grammar have been
presented in the previous section. What follows is an overview of the PoCo lexer rules.
Listing 4.1 shows a portion of the PoCo lexer modes. This portion of code contains many of
the PoCo syntax related to policy declaration, executions, and exchanges. Recall from the previous
section that PoCo’s unique situation requiring PoCo syntax to be parsed within regular expression
literals requires us to use lexer modes. Lines 17 and 34 are examples of pushing a new lexing mode
onto the stack when a certain character is encountered (e.g. when the opening backtick ` of a
regular expression is found).
Listing 4.2 contains the next portion of PoCo lexer modes. Note that on Line 58, a new mode
named INSIDERE begins. This mode specifies the tokens within a regular-expression literal. The
SYM token catches all string literal characters except those reserved for PoCo-specific syntax. We
also transition to other modes when we encounter a start symbol for a PoCo language structure
(e.g. the @ symbol for variable binding).
Listing 4.3 contains the final portion of the PoCo lexer modes. In this listing four addi-
tional modes are declared, REVAR for the $ variable syntax, OBJECT for the # object syntax, and
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58 mode INSIDERE;
59
60 INIT: '<init>' ;
61 SYM: ('\\' [`\[\]\?@%$\\\*\+:,\(\){}<>#\'\|] | ~[`\[\]\?@%$\\\*\+:,\(\){}<>#\'\|])+ ;
62 RELPAREN: '(' -> type(LPAREN) ;
63 RERPAREN: ')' -> type(RPAREN) ;
64 RELBRACE: '{' -> type(LBRACE) ;
65 RERBRACE: '}' -> type(RBRACE) ;
66 REDOLLAR: '$' -> type(DOLLAR), pushMode(REVAR) ;
67 REAT: '@' -> type(AT), pushMode(REBIND) ;
68 APOSTROPHE: '\'' -> popMode ;
69 VARCLOSE: ']' -> type(RBRACKET) ;
70 REASTERISK: '*' -> type(ASTERISK) ;
71 REPLUS: '+' -> type(PLUS) ;
72 REQUESTION: '?' -> type(QUESTION) ;
73 REBOP: '|' -> type(BAR);
74 REPOUND: '#' -> type(POUND), pushMode(OBJECT) ;
75 RECOLON: ':' -> type(COLON) ;
76 RECOMMA: ',' -> type(COMMA) ;
77 REWILD: '%' ;
78 NEST: '`' -> type(LTICK), pushMode(INSIDERE) ;
Listing 4.2. PoCo Lexer Modes Lines 58-78
TRANSACTIONS for code written in the Java language. The REVAR and OBJECT modes are all used to
obtain a token for a variable identifier. Since variable usage in PoCo does not have a distinct end
symbol (e.g. $call), all possible end symbols must be enumerated in this mode. This involves du-
plication of most of the values in the INSIDERE mode from Listing 4.2. The TRANSACTIONS mode is
designed to take the native Java code verbatim and contain it within a single token, TRANSCONTENT.
4.3 Parser Grammar
The entire PoCo parser grammar is designed to identify all PoCo related structures in a policy
whether they exist inside or outside of a regular expression. While most of it mirrors the syntax
and semantic examples presented earlier in the chapter, there are some parts of the grammar worth
discussing in detail: regular expression grammars.
Line 173 of Listing 4.4 is of particular interest. This marks the start of the grammar rule re for
PoCo-style regular expressions. Within this rule are the multiple items that can appear within a
PoCo regular expression. Previously, it was mentioned that the PoCo parser maintains the string
literal tokens of the regular expression alongside the syntactically-relevant parts. This rule makes it
possible. Note that re is defined recursively (see Lines 183-184). The rebop (RE binary operator)
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84 mode REVAR;
85
86 ID3: [a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_\-]* -> type(ID) ;
87 DOT2: '.' -> type(DOT) ;
88 REVARAPOSTR:'\'' -> type(APOSTROPHE), popMode, popMode ;
89 WS2: [ \t\r\n] -> type(SYM), popMode ;
90 EXITVAR1: '(' -> type(LPAREN), popMode ;
91 EXITVAR2: ')' -> type(RPAREN), popMode ;
92 EXITVAR3: '{' -> type(LBRACE), popMode ;
93 EXITVAR4: '}' -> type(RBRACE), popMode ;
94 EXITVAR5: ']' -> type(RBRACKET), popMode ;
95 EXITVAR6: '*' -> type(ASTERISK), popMode ;
96 EXITVAR7: '+' -> type(PLUS), popMode ;
97 EXITVAR8: '?' -> type(QUESTION), popMode ;
98 EXITVAR9: '|' -> type(BAR), popMode ;
99 EXITVAR10: ':' -> type(COLON), popMode ;
100 EXITVAR11: ',' -> type(COMMA), popMode ;
101 ESCAPED: ('\\' [`\[\]\?@%$\\\*\+:,\(\){}<>#\'\|]) -> type(SYM), popMode ;
102
103 mode OBJECT;
104
105 ID4: [a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_\-]* -> type(ID) ;
106 DOT3: '.' -> type(DOT) ;
107 OBJLBRACE: '{' -> type(LBRACE), popMode ;
108
109 mode TRANSACTIONS;
110
111 ENDTRANS: 'end transaction';
112 QUOTEDCONTENT: '"' ( '\\"' | . )*? '"' ;
113 TRANSCONTENT: ((~('"')) | QUOTEDCONTENT)+? ENDTRANS -> popMode;
Listing 4.3. PoCo Lexer Modes Lines 84-113
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173 re: rewild |
174 DOLLAR qid LPAREN opparamlist RPAREN |
175 DOLLAR qid |
176 function |
177 object |
178 LPAREN re RPAREN |
179 LPAREN RPAREN |
180 AT id LBRACKET re RBRACKET |
181 INIT |
182 SYM+ |
183 re reuop |
184 re rebop re ;
185
186 function: fxnname INIT LPAREN arglist RPAREN |
187 fxnname LPAREN arglist RPAREN ;
188
189 fxnname: SYM+ |
190 object |
191 object SYM+ ;
192
193 arglist: re |
194 arglist COMMA re |
195 ;
196
197 rebop: BAR |
198 ;
199
200 reuop: ASTERISK |
201 PLUS |
202 QUESTION ;
203
204 rewild: REWILD ;
Listing 4.4. PoCo Parser Grammar Lines 173-204
rule on Line 198 allows itself to be empty. This means that re rules can be combined without any
separators. Similarly, the rule on Line 198 allows the re node to absorb as many syntactically-
irrelevant characters as needed — this accomplishes the stated goal of preserving the string literal
tokens alongside the PoCo-specific structures.
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CHAPTER 5
STATIC ANALYSIS SCANNER TOOL
One of my contributions to the PoCo project was to create a static analysis tool that gives
policy writers a visual mapping between their policy and the methods it will interact with [15]. A
single PoCo policy and any number of compiled Java classes or JAR (Java archive — a zip package
of compiled Java classes) files may be input into the tool. The tool extracts all regular expressions
from the PoCo policy that are used to match action events. With this list of regular expressions,
the compiled Java code and referenced libraries are scanned for all method calls. Each method call
is mapped to zero or more of the regular expressions. The final output is a table listing all methods
that will be matched by each regular expression in a policy.
Our PoCo compiler implementation outputs a combination of AspectJ and Java code to imple-
ment PoCo policies. Recall from Section 2.2 that AspectJ uses pointcuts to define where to execute
an advice’s code [27]. Pointcuts define a method signature pattern. Any method that matches this
pattern will trigger that pointcut. While there are a number of pointcut types, there are two that
are applicable to the PoCo project: execution and call pointcuts. An execution pointcut triggers
a piece of advice at the execution point of a method, while a call pointcut triggers advice at the
place a call to the specified method is made.
To illustrate the difference between execution and call pointcuts, consider a pointcut that
matches the Java standard library method System.out.println(). Also assume that this AspectJ
code is only instrumenting a third-party application that we intend to monitor. If we declare the
pointcut as an execution pointcut, no advice using this pointcut would trigger even when the
monitored program uses System.out.println(), while a call pointcut would trigger execution as
expected. The difference is that an execution pointcut will only function properly if the Java code
containing the method is also instrumented by the AspectJ compiler. In this case, the Java standard
library (rt.jar — over 60 MB on a Java 8 JRE) would need to be instrumented. However, using
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a call pointcut would result in the expected behavior and only need to instrument the monitored
Java program.
The scanner tool has two iterations that correspond to changes in the underlying PoCo compiler
implementation. Midway through development, the PoCo compiler switched from using execution
pointcuts to using call pointcuts. Both iterations will be described in the following sections starting
with the initial premise and ending with the current functionality.
5.1 First Scanner Tool: Execution Pointcuts in AspectJ
Initially, the PoCo compiler was outputting AspectJ code using execution pointcuts. The ad-
vantage to using execution pointcuts is that monitored programs cannot use reflection to bypass
policies. Execution pointcuts trigger at the execution site of a method and are triggered regard-
less of the mechanism by which a method is invoked. As demonstrated in the previous section’s
example, the disadvantage of using execution pointcuts is that all code and libraries used by the
monitored program must also be instrumented by the AspectJ code.
The scanner tool was initially envisioned as both a static analysis tool to assist policy designers
by visualizing the scope of their PoCo policy and also perform a required task for PoCo policy
compilation. While AspectJ supports some wildcard features and variable numbers of arguments
in pointcut declarations, they are not as expressive as regular expressions. The scanner tool’s most
important purpose was to translate the regular expressions from a PoCo policy into concrete lists
of methods that can be translated into AspectJ pointcuts during compilation.
Performance was a major concern with the initial iteration of the scanner tool. All libraries used
by the monitored program must be input into the tool. At the very least this means that Java’s
standard libraries must be input. When testing on a Java 8 Update 31 JRE, the rt.jar containing
most of the Java standard library had over 179,000 methods signatures. Each regular expression
from the PoCo policy must iterate over the set of extracted method signatures, creating a significant
processing bottleneck. By splitting up the matching task into four threads, average runtime was
decreased from an average of 8152 milliseconds to just 3382 milliseconds — an almost 2.5 times
speedup. The test involved 30 regular expressions containing known Java Standard Library method
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names (e.g. println) and a method signature pool of 221,833 methods for a total of over 6.5 million
regular expression comparisons.
5.2 Second Scanner Tool: Call Pointcuts in AspectJ
During the development of the PoCo compiler, the research team collectively decided that we
should be using call pointcuts instead of execution pointcuts in our generated AspectJ code. When
using execution pointcuts, the requirement that a policy designer input all libraries and code into
the scanner tool places an extra burden on the policy designer as he or she must know the location
of all code used by the monitored program. It also creates an opportunity for error and a false sense
of security: if the policy designer forgets to instrument a library used by their monitored program,
their policy will be unaware of any code that is executed within that library. Using call pointcuts
obviates the need to instrument the entire runtime environment. Note that call pointcuts will not
capture calls to monitored methods from methods declared outside the monitored program (e.g.
library methods). We can get around this limitation by instrumenting the libraries used by the
monitored program, however in PoCo we leave this as the responsibility of the policy designer to
know what methods have security-relevant side-effects.
As previously mentioned, call pointcuts are unable to trigger when a monitored function is
invoked via an alternate means such as reflection. To address this issue, the initial PoCo imple-
mentation will monitor calls to Java’s reflection APIs and allow the policy designer to restrict
access to these language features. As a result of the switch, only the monitored program must be
input into the scanner tool. This results in a smaller and more targeted set of method signatures
that must be compared with the PoCo policy. The performance issues of the initial iteration will
therefore be reduced, however the processing is still multithreaded for greater scalability.
5.3 Scanner Tool Implementation Details
The Scanner tool is implemented as a Java 8 Swing GUI program. The ASM 5 bytecode
engineering library [10] is used to decode compiled Java programs and extract their method calls.
ANTLR 4.5 [24] is used to parse the input PoCo policy.
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Figure 5.1. Initial setup screen of the PoCo scanner tool.
The initial screen of the PoCo scanner tool is shown in Figure 5.1. Any number of compiled Java
files may be input for scanning; however, the typical usage scenario only requires the monitored
Java program to be input. When the user clicks on the “Generate Mappings” button, the tool
begins a series of operations, detailed below:
1. Create parse tree. At this stage a parse tree of the input PoCo policy is constructed using
the ANTLR library.
2. Parse variable and function information. The tool walks the PoCo policy parse tree and
creates a catalog of the declared variables and functions. Each variable or function’s name,
type, and contents are stored in the catalog.
3. Parse PoCo policy body. The tool walks the parse tree and evaluates each action-matching
regular expression. These regular expressions are then resolved so that all variable and func-
tion references are evaluated and expanded. If at any point during this process a regular
expression depends on a variable that is bound at run time, the matching expression is ig-
nored and a warning is issued to alert the user of the potential incompleteness of the scan.
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Figure 5.2. Results screen of the PoCo scanner tool.
4. Scan compiled Java files. Obtains a list of method call signatures from the compiled Java
bytecode.
5. Map expressions obtained in Step 3 to the signatures obtained in Step 4.
Once the mapping process is complete, the user can navigate to the second tab of the tool’s
interface seen in Figure 5.2. Each regular expression obtained from the PoCo policy is listed in the
left pane, and a list of all method calls the regular expression matches is listed in the right pane.
The PoCo scanner tool doubles as a static analysis tool for policy designers and an integral step
in the compilation of the PoCo policy. Translating between the regular expressions of a PoCo policy
to concrete method signatures is further complicated by the addition of PoCo-specific syntax which
must be parsed and evaluated to convert to a canonical regular expression in the Java language.
Policy designers may use the tool to evaluate whether their matching expressions are too broad
(which may negatively impact performance, due to unnecessary policy queries) or too narrow (which
may negatively impact security due to some security-relevant actions not being monitored).
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CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION
My final contribution to the PoCo project was to work on an implementation and compiler
of the PoCo language to demonstrate PoCo’s feasibility. This project was a joint effort between
myself, Yan Albright, Danielle Ferguson, and Donald Ray [1]. Our implementation is Java based,
allowing PoCo policies to monitor arbitrary Java programs by inlining hooks into the program’s
bytecode. We use the following open-source tools in our PoCo compiler:
• ANTLR 4 [24] for parser and lexer generation.
• ASM [10] for analyzing compiled Java bytecode.
• AspectJ [27] for inlining policy code into compiled Java programs.
The following sections will cover the high level structure of our PoCo implementation, challenges
and solutions for implementing PoCo, and an example of a compiled PoCo policy.
6.1 Implementation Strategy
The implementation of the PoCo compiler is influenced by the work done on the LoPSiL
language [11]. LoPSiL’s implementation uses AspectJ as an intermediate language to intercept
security-relevant method calls and query a policy object. PoCo’s implementation is similar. As
discussed in Section 2.2 and Chapter 5, the PoCo implementation outputs AspectJ code that uses
call pointcuts to intercept security-relevant methods. A piece of around advice executes at the
call site for each security relevant method. “Around” advice effectively replaces the method body
with our own code that can yield control to the original method if needed. Within this advice,
we forward the details of the action to the PoCo policy runtime, which will query its policies and
return a result.
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AspectJ Around Advice
Before Query policy with Action
PoCo Policy Policy acts on query
Act on query result
Perform action
Return control to Advice
Query policy with Result
Act on query result Return control to Advice
Return control to 
monitored program
Figure 6.1. Control flow once an AspectJ pointcut is triggered at a security-relevant method.
Figure 6.1 shows how the execution flow of a monitored program is modified once an AspectJ
pointcut is triggered. The compiler creates pointcuts for all methods considered security-relevant
by its policies. Once one of these methods is called, the AspectJ Advice associated with it executes.
Once the advice has control, it queries the PoCo runtime about the attempted action.
Once the PoCo runtime and policies are queried, the following scenarios may occur:
1. The set of permitted actions includes the queried action. In this case, the action is allowed
to execute.
2. Neither the set of permitted nor the set of disallowed actions contain the queried action. If
the set of permitted actions is finite, an alternate action is performed at random. Otherwise,
this is treated as a neutral result and the queried action is performed.
3. The set of disallowed actions includes the queried action, and the set of permitted actions
is finite and not empty. In this case the runtime promotes an action at random as in the
previous case.
4. The set of disallowed actions includes the queried action, and the set of permitted actions is
not finite or empty. In this case, the action is prevented and the program will halt.
5. The sets of permitted and disallowed actions are both empty. This is a neutral result and the
monitor will by default allow the queried action to execute.
The following sections will detail the compile-time and runtime aspects of our PoCo implemen-
tation.
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6.2 Compilation Process
The PoCo compiler inputs one or more PoCo policy files and a compiled Java program to
monitor. The compiler outputs an AspectJ file and compiled PoCo runtime that are then input
into the AspectJ compiler to instrument the monitored program. This section will focus on the
steps involved in creating the AspectJ file while the next section will detail how the PoCo runtime
is constructed.
There are three modules that make up the PoCo compiler: the parser, the static analysis
scan, and the code generation. The parser was detailed in Chapter 4. The static analysis is
a wholly optional module that gives a policy designer feedback about potential ambiguities and
undefined behavior within their policies. Because this module was completed independently by
another member of the group, it will not be detailed here. The code generation module outputs
the AspectJ and Java source files from the provided PoCo policies. The steps taken by the code
generation module are as follows:
1. Generate closure. The compiler walks the PoCo parse tree and generates a data structure to
hold information about all variable and function declarations within the PoCo policies.
2. Extract pointcuts. The compiler walks the entire PoCo parse tree to acquire signatures of all
security-relevant methods for AspectJ pointcut generation.
3. Generate AspectJ file. The AspectJ file contains all pointcuts and advice for instrumenting
the monitored program as well as hooks to the PoCo runtime.
4. Generate Java files. The logic of each inputted PoCo policy is reimplemented as a Java class
that interacts with the PoCo runtime and AspectJ advice.
Each of these steps will next be described in greater detail.
6.2.1 Closure Generation
PoCo policies declare global and policy-scope variables and functions before the body of a policy
begins. These variables, which are bound at runtime, must be considered by the code generation
module later in the compilation process. Functions may or may not be parameterized however their
bodies are static at compile time.
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The process of Closure generation follows similarly to the variable and function parsing per-
formed in the Scanner Tool in Chapter 5. The parse tree of the policy is traversed up to and
including the variable and function definitions. Each variable and function’s return type, value,
and parameters are then saved into the closure. During this step the compiler will also discover
and output errors related to duplicate variable and function names.
6.2.2 Pointcut Extraction
AspectJ advice is only inlined into the monitored program at the locations specified by pointcuts,
therefore the PoCo compiler has to know at compile-time all methods considered security-relevant
by the inputted PoCo policies. To generate a list of the security-relevant methods, the PoCo
compiler again uses the same process employed in the Scanner Tool in Chapter 5.
The compiler will step through the parse tree and monitor the match structures within each
PoCo exchange (see Chapter 3). Recall that a PoCo exchange can match either actions, results,
or both. Within the match structures are regular expressions (called REs in PoCo). The PoCo
compiler analyzes and parses these regular expressions to create pointcut signatures compatible
with AspectJ. While AspectJ’s pointcut notation has some wildcard and variable-length argument
list features, it is not as expressive as regular expressions [27]. Special care must be taken by the
PoCo compiler to translate the regular expressions into AspectJ pointcut notation without changing
the original expression’s scope.
Consider a PoCo regular expression that matches events of the form `Open(Port|Socket)'.
This expression could match both a function call to OpenPort() and OpenSocket(). This would
require two separate pointcut declarations in AspectJ. Our compiler uses the same process used in
the Scanner Tool in Chapter 5 to bridge the gap between PoCo’s expressive syntax and AspectJ. To
generate all the pointcut expressions for a single PoCo regular expression, the compiler extracts a
list of all method codes from the monitored Java program. The PoCo regular expressions are then
matched against this list to generate a mapping from regular expression to actual method calls.
6.2.3 AspectJ Generation
Our compiler outputs a single AspectJ file per monitored program. Recall from Section 2.2 that
pointcuts specify where advice will execute in AspectJ. Using the extracted pointcut signatures from
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1 AllowOnlyMIME():
2 @ports()[!`#int{143|993|25|110|995}']: RE
3 <_ => -`java.net.ServerSocket.<init>($ports)'>*
Listing 6.1. AllowOnlyMIME PoCo Policy
the previous section, the compiler outputs all pointcuts in the first part of the AspectJ file. The
second part of the file is composed of advice that executes for each pointcut. The advice that is
generated will execute before and after each security-relevant method is invoked. Within the advice,
our PoCo policy and runtime are queried with information about that specific method invocation.
A simple example PoCo policy is presented in Listing 6.1 to illustrate the generation of AspectJ
pointcuts and around advice.
Listing 6.1 contains a small PoCo policy that prevents a monitored program from opening
sockets to ports other than those specified on Line 2. Looking closely at Line 2, there is a ! symbol
at the start of the function definition, meaning ports defines the set of ports excluding the ones
listed. Line 3 is the only exchange of the policy and simply returns a negative SRE for all queries.
Negative SREs express that a policy wishes to deny an action. Whether or not the action is denied
is not known here—the root policy decides what result will ultimately be returned to the runtime.
Listing 6.2 contains the first part of the code generated from the PoCo policy in Listing 6.1. This
part contains the generated AspectJ code and excludes the Java code implementing the policy’s
logic.
Line 7 contains the root policy declaration. For simple situations where a single policy is being
compiled, the PoCo compiler will generate a default root policy that forwards the results of the
inputted policy (in this case, the AllowOnlyMIME policy).
The AspectJ-specific syntax begins on Line 9 and ends on line 19. Lines 9-10 contains the
policy’s first and only pointcut definition. Here the pointcut is declared as a call pointcut
(i.e. our advice is inlined at the call site, not the execution site), on all methods matching
java.net.ServerSocket.new(), with a single integer parameter.
Line 12 begins the first and only advice. This advice is declared as around advice, which means
that the code is inlined in such a way that the advice itself absorbs the method call. Inside this
advice, we compare the method call’s single integer argument (its value is in the variable value0)
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1 import com.poco.PoCoRuntime.*;
2 import java.lang.reflect.Method;
3
4 import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
5
6 public aspect AspectAllowOnlyMIME {
7 private RootPolicy root = new RootPolicy(new AllowOnlyMIME() );
8
9 pointcut PointCut0(int value0):
10 call(java.net.ServerSocket.new(int)) && args(value0);
11
12 Object around(int value0): PointCut0(value0) {
13 if (RuntimeUtils.StringMatch(new Integer(value0).toString(),
14 "[^143|993|25|110|995]")) {
15 root.queryAction(new Action(thisJoinPoint));
16 return proceed(value0);
17 } else
18 return proceed(value0);
19 }
Listing 6.2. AllowOnlyMIME AspectJ code
with set of disallowed values. If it matches, we query the policy in Line 15, otherwise we let the
method continue in Line 18.
6.2.4 Java File Generation
The final step of the compilation process involves generating a Java representation of the in-
putted PoCo policy. The code outputted in this step effectively rebuilds the PoCo policy’s structure
as a collection of Java objects that mimic the PoCo language structure at runtime. The code out-
putted in this step is fairly simplistic, as the actual behavior of the objects is fleshed out in the
PoCo runtime. Only the declared variables, functions, and structure of the inputted policy are
translated to Java code, not the functionality. The policy class created in this step extends a policy
class that exists in the runtime. This outputted Java file derives much of its functionality from the
included PoCo runtime, discussed in the next section.
This AspectJ file contains the blueprint for how we’d like to inline our code in the monitored
program. The Java file contains the policy itself. We use the AspectJ compiler to perform the code
inlining task. The generated AspectJ and Java files are input along with the monitored program.
The AspectJ compiler then weaves the advice from the AspectJ file into the monitored program
and outputs a new, instrumented binary.
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21 class AllowOnlyMIME extends Policy {
22 public AllowOnlyMIME() {
23 try {
24 SequentialExecution rootExec = new SequentialExecution("none");
25 SequentialExecution exec0 = new SequentialExecution("*");
26 Exchange exch0 = new Exchange();
27 Match match0 = new Match(
28 "java.net.ServerSocket.new(#int{[^143|993|25|110|995]})"
29 );
30 exch0.addMatcher(match0);
31 SRE sre0 = new SRE(null, null);
32 sre0.setNegativeRE(
33 "java.net.ServerSocket.new(#int{[^143|993|25|110|995]})"
34 );
35 exch0.setSRE(sre0);
36 exec0.addChild(exch0);
37 exec0.setHasExch(true);
38 rootExec.addChild(exec0);
39 rootExec.getCurrentChildModifier();
40 setRootExecution(rootExec);
41 } catch (PoCoException pex) {
42 System.out.println(pex.getMessage());
43 pex.printStackTrace();
44 System.exit(-1);
45 }
46 }
47 }
48 }
Listing 6.3. AllowOnlyMIME Java code
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Listing 6.3 contains the generated AspectJ and Java code from the PoCo compiler. Line 21
begins the Java representation of the original PoCo policy. On Line 24 begins the process of
recreating the input policy as a collection of PoCo runtime objects. Notice that the flow of the code
follows the traversal of a parse tree. The compiler creates runtime objects as they are encountered,
fleshes them out, parses objects contained within, and connects the objects together as it navigates
back up the tree. The sole execution of the policy is created in Line 25 (the root execution created
on Line 24 is an implementation detail), with a * modifier indicating that the execution can repeat
zero or more times. The policy’s sole exchange is built up in Lines 26-35, with a match object
and negative SRE created in Lines 27 and 32 respectively. A policy object always needs a root
execution and as a result Line 40 is always required in any generated PoCo policy.
While the AspectJ and Java code are presented here in a single file for convenience, all compiled
PoCo policies follow the same structure: a series of pointcuts inline advice at security-relevant
method calls, and the advice query the PoCo root policy for a decision each time they are triggered.
6.3 PoCo Runtime System
The PoCo runtime is actually three parts: 1) the inlined AspectJ advice, 2) the Java policy
class outputted by the compiler, and 3) the PoCo runtime support library. Much of the Java code
outputted by the PoCo compiler relies on the PoCo runtime library for its functionality. This
support library is static — it does not have to be recreated or recompiled for each new PoCo policy
or monitored program. It can be thought of as a packaging of all the PoCo-specific boilerplate code
that each policy requires.
PoCo semantics significantly differ from Java’s, so our approach relies on a layer of abstraction
where PoCo structures (e.g. exchanges, executions, SREs) are created as Java objects that en-
capsulate PoCo-specific functionality. The PoCo runtime implements abstract, queryable policy
classes that are forwarded events from the inlined AspectJ advice. The steps involved in querying
the PoCo runtime are as follows:
1. When a pointcut is triggered, the advice constructs an Event object that contains the method
signature, details about its arguments, and whether this is an Action or Result.
2. The root PoCo policy is queried with the Event object from the AspectJ advice.
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3. The root PoCo policy queries all subpolicies in the DAG, starting with the leaves. Each
policy’s result is also saved so that each policy is only ever queried once per event.
4. The advice receives the result from the root policy and reacts accordingly, either halting
execution or allowing the action to proceed.
The PoCo runtime is simulateneously the most critical part of the PoCo implementation as
it provides most of the PoCo functionality in Java, and the most unremarkable as it is simply a
Java implementation of the control flows and logic outlined in the PoCo specification [17]. The
noteworthy portions of the PoCo implementation are the pieces outlined earlier in this chapter that
convert a dynamic and expressive language like PoCo to an AspectJ and Java program.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The PoCo language is unique among existing policy specification languages because of its use
of signed regular expressions (SREs) to denote sets of allowed and denied actions. This use of
SREs as the output of policies lends itself to predictable policy composition that exhibits some
algebraic properties because SREs can be combined with traditional set operations such as union,
intersection, and disjunction [17].
My work’s central thesis is that an implementation of an expressive, general-purpose policy
specification language that uses regular expressions as a means for conveying decisions is possible
on the Java platform. My contributions to the PoCo project have made this a reality with a
working implementation of the PoCo language compiler and runtime for the Java platform. First,
I implemented a fully-functional formal grammar for the PoCo language, allowing us to generate
a parser and lexer for the language. Second, I developed a static analysis “Scanner Tool” that
provides PoCo policy designers with insight into how their policy will interact with a monitored
program’s method calls. Finally, I initiated and contributed towards development of the PoCo
compiler and runtime on the Java platform.
The completion of this thesis proves the viability of the PoCo project, but there is still more
work to be done to take advantage of the language’s set-based policy composition. One interest-
ing area of further development of the language is porting it to a popular mobile platform that
is based on Java: Android. Porting PoCo to Android would allow smartphone users to feel at
ease installing applications that come from untrusted sources, or applications that ask for more
permissions than are seemingly necessary. PoCo on Android would also provide invaluable insights
into the language’s shortcomings and inefficiencies on a mobile platform where inefficient code can
quickly cause performance or battery life problems. Having PoCo on such a vibrant and growing
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Java-based platform would both benefit those who work on the language with experience and test
data, but would also further the language’s reach beyond desktop Java.
There are some significant hurdles to implementing PoCo on Android smartphones, some tech-
nical and some practical. One technical hurdle is that PoCo requires the original binary of an ap-
plication to be rewritten with PoCo policy code weaved into it, which will break any cryptographic
signatures the original application had. The Android OS is by default restrictive to applications
that do not have a valid signature. A practical hurdle is the issue of having to instrument an
application with a policy on a computer prior to uploading it to an Android device. There may be
the possibility of bundling a PoCo compiler application onto the device itself to bypass this issue.
Another future work item for PoCo is generalization of the language to other platforms outside
of the Java ecosystem, such as C# and Microsoft’s .NET. Porting PoCo to C# is a logical leap
from the Java platform because .NET and Java share many similarities, from syntax to the use of
bytecode and a virtual machine. Integrating PoCo with a Microsoft platform would further expand
its reach to an extremely vast software ecosystem centered around Windows applications.
It is my feeling that the implementation of the PoCo compiler and runtime is an important
step in the language’s journey from concept to practical tool. Expanding the language to other
platforms while refining and improving its performance will be key to expanding its reach even
further. We have shown that PoCo’s innovative concepts are viable and can assist policy designers
in creating more modular, self-contained policies so that they can be combined in predictable and
standard ways without added complexity from language peculiarities.
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